The last fifteen years have seen a proliferation of peace agreements. Some 50 percent of civil wars have terminated in peace agreements since 1990, more than in the previous two centuries combined, when only one in five resulted in negotiated settlement.' Numerically, these settlements amount to over three hundred peace agreements in some forty jurisdictions.2 International standards have even begun to regulate peace agreements. United Nations guidelines, guidelines and recommendations of the secretary-general, and Security Council resolutions have all normatively addressed peace agreements: both the processes by which they are negotiated and their substance, particularly with relation to accountability for past human rights abuses.3
different stages of a conflict: prenegotiation agreements, framework/substantive agreements, and implementation/renegotiation agreements.19
Prenegotiation Agreements
The prenegotiation stage of a peace process, often termed "talks about talks," typically revolves around how to get everyone to the negotiating table with an agreed-upon agenda. For parties to a long-term conflict, any move to the negotiating table is a trial-and-error process linked to whether they perceive themselves as getting more at the table than on the battlefield. For face-to-face or proximity negotiations to take place at all, parties need assurances that the talks will not be used by the other side to gain military and/or political advantages.20 The prenegotiation stage tends to focus on who is going to negotiate and with what status, raising issues such as the return of negotiators from exile or their release from prison; safeguards as to future physical integrity and freedom from imprisonment; and limits on how the war may be waged while negotiations take place.21 Often agreements emerging at this stage are incremental with the aim of building to a formal cease-fire that will enable multiparty talks. Typically, they do not include all the parties to the conflict but take the form of bilateral agreements between some of the parties and remain secret until a later date. Regional initiatives may also form a "pre" agreements vary in the degree of detail they contain-either full detail or principles with accompanying processes of reform may be provided. They also vary as to whether conflicts over sovereignty, statehood, and identity are completely resolved (as they largely were in South Africa); partially resolved and partially postponed (Northern Ireland); or almost completely postponed (Kosovo and Israel/Palestine). Some processes work toward one framework agreement with lengthy and detailed provisions aimed at dealing holistically with the issues, such as the Belfast Agreement and the South African Interim Constitution.30 Other processes, such as those of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Burundi, build up consensus issue by issue in a set of agreements that are ultimately brought together or ratified by a comprehensive final agreement. 31 Once framework agreements are reached in formal talks, their implementation requires parties to make fundamental compromises with respect to their preferred outcome and their use of force. They will do so only if they feel that the commitments they obtained from the other side are going to be implemented. This need for reciprocity is reflected in the attention the parties pay to the detail of the wording of agreements and the frequent use of lawyers during negotiations. Peace agreements share a legal-looking structure, with preambles, sections, articles, and annexes. They also share legal-type language, speaking of parties, signatories, and binding obligations. The structure and language of peace agreements suggest that the parties mutually view them as legal documents. However, they do not easily fit within traditional legal categories such as treaty, international agreement, or constitution. The main reason is that the conflicts themselves are neither clearly interstate nor clearly internal.32 Peace agreements deal both with the external legitimacy of the state and the transnational dimensions of the conflict, and with the state's internal constitutional order. The presence ofnonstate signatories tends to take them outside international legal definitions of"treaty" or "international agreement," while the presence of multiple state parties tends to make them difficult to analyze as domestic legal documents. This feature is discussed further in part II below.
Implementation/Renegotiation Agreements
Implementation agreements begin to advance and develop aspects of the framework, fleshing out their detail. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II) filled out and partially implemented the framework in Oslo I; the South African final Constitution developed and implemented the Interim Constitution.33 By their nature, implementation agreements involve new negotiations and in practice often undergo a measure of renegotiation as parties test whether they can claw back concessions made at an earlier stage. Implementation agreements typically include all the parties to the framework agreement. Sometimes implementation agreements are not documented, and sometimes they take on recognizable legal forms. Indeed, to some extent, the notion of ongoing agreements being "peace agreements" may begin to disappear at this point as the conflict resolution attempts of the peace process merge imperceptibly into the ongoing processes of public law, signifying a measure of success. Thus, treaties appear 30 Belfast Agreement, supra note 29; INTERIM CONST., supra note 29. 31 The fact that the present Convention does not apply to international agreements concluded between states and other subjects of international law or between such other subjects of international law, or to international agreements not in written form, shall not affect:
(a) the legal force of such agreements; (b) the application to them of any of the rules set forth in the present Convention to which they would be subject under international law independently of the Convention; (c) the application of the Convention to the relations of states as between themselves under international agreements to which other subjects of international law are also parties. This provision is significant for the current discussion because it indicates that agreements between state and nonstate parties that are subjects of international law, or indeed between such nonstate parties alone, can be legally binding international agreements. Thus, customary law rules as regards formation and breach, similar to those codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention, apply.44 However, the Vienna Convention's notion of "subjects of international law" leaves a gray area concerning who can claim such status that has assumed far greater importance than when the Convention was drafted in 1969, and is particularly relevant to practice relating to peace agreements. 
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[Vol. 100:373 claiming the status of subjects of international law. While an extended discussion of their international legal status is beyond the scope of this article, a brief summary can illustrate their claims. Most obviously, armed opposition groups sign peace agreements as main protagonists of internal conflicts. In many peace agreements signed by armed opposition groups, grounds can be found to assert that the parties intended the agreement to be binding on the international legal plane, and that the nonstate signatories were "subjects of international law"-based on the recognition of such groups under international law, in particular through humanitarian law.46 Many agreements potentially fulfill these criteria and could serve as examples; all use formal legal language and have international signatories. These include agreements in Angola (between the government and UNITA), Burundi (between the government, armed opposition groups, and political parties), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (between the government and armed opposition groups), Guatemala (between the government and Unidad revolucionaria nacional guatemalteca (URNG)), El Salvador (between the government and the Frente farabundo marti the Mexican government; between Bangladesh and the indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hills Tract; between the Indian government and tribal groups from northeast India; between France and the Kanaks of New Caledonia; and between the Guatemalan government and Unidad revolucionaria nacional guatemalteca concerning indigenous groups (here as part of a series of agreements within a broader peace process).50 These agreements provided for ceasefires and broad frameworks for governance designed to address key issues in the conflict. Similar agreements have been signed in situations that-while less clearly involving violent conflict-did involve ongoing land disputes connected with self-determination, and what could be called the "structural violence" ofmarginalization.51 Such agreements were concluded between South Africa and the tKhomani San, and, in a rapidly growing number, between indigenous peoples and the Canadian government.52 Both types of indigenous peoples' agreements evidence a legal nature, in terms of the language used, the type of commitments made by the parties, and the provision for detailed reciprocal bargains. The agreements also deal with matters integral to the notion of statehood, such as sovereignty, territory, government, and the language of "self-determination." In some cases, they provide for legislation to give commitments domestic legal status. course, be signed by substate entities such as the constituent parts of a federation, depending on the powers conferred on them domestically.54 However, in these cases the status of the substate entity and its relationship to the state are disputed and the entity is typically operating extraconstitutionally. Nonstate groups could again attempt to argue that they are "subjects of international law" because they represent minority groups. While legal documents dealing with minorities have proliferated and arguably confer on them a right as groups, their claim to international subjectivity is generally considered to be weaker than that of indigenous peoples.55 Furthermore, there is little guiding authority on the mechanisms by which political or military leaders (mostly men) can claim to be the legitimate representatives of minority groups, although elections would provide some basis for the claim. Other claims to legal subjectivity might lie in the concept of the "state-in-the-making" whose treaty-making capacity must be recognized for statehood to be negotiated, or recognition that the minority's representatives have status as a national liberation movement or erstwhile armed group.56 To some extent, the problem of legal status reflects international law's difficulties in dealing with transitional situations. The categorization of nonstate actors as minorities rather than armed opposition groups, national liberation movements, or even states is itself a product of transition. In the course of the peace process, both the legal regime and the humanitarian law status of nonstate groups change, as the group moves from armed opposition to inclusion in government and the level of conflict subsides.57 A lack of governmental status (regional or otherwise) often ensues because the peace process has subsequently stalled, leaving the status of both the substate region and those who govern it in legal limbo. 58 The difficulty is that deciding whether some or all of the above agreements constitute bind- acknowledge that soft law or informal agreements generate some of the same pressures for compliance as the hard law or formal ones, and can be equally effective.71 Moreover, even hard law commitments do not operate in a "monolithic or unidimensional" way.72
These considerations led Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, and Snidal to propose a broader concept of"legalization" as more useful to understanding an agreement's legal status than deciding whether it constitutes hard or soft law.73 They set out a three-way matrix that maps the legalization of an agreement or norm according to (1) how "legal" the nature of the obligation is, (2) the precision with which it is drafted, and (3) the delegation to a third party of the power to interpret and enforce the agreement. Thus, an obligation expressed as a binding rule in precise language, to be enforced by an international court or organization, might stand "near the ideal type of full legalization, as in highly developed domestic legal systems."74 A loose obligation, such as an expressly nonlegal norm, stated as a vague principle, to be enforced only by means of diplomacy, would stand at the other end of the spectrum. However, in between it is more difficult to separate and order the three dimensions:
In some settings a strong legal obligation ... might be more legalized than a weaker obligation ... , even if the latter were more precise and entailed stronger delegation. Furthermore, the relative significance of delegation vis-a-vis other dimensions becomes less clear at lower levels, since truly "high" delegation, including judicial or quasi-judicial authority, almost never exists together with low levels of legal obligation.75 Therefore, the degree of legalization is captured by all three factors rather than just one. 86 Cf Wedgwood, supra note 85, at 34 (Wedgwood's (converse) argument relating to the difficulties of lack of legal status for nonstate actors). 87 See Vienna Convention, supra note 36, Art. 3(c); cf Cassese, supra note 64, at 1139-40 (noting the argument that translating Sierra Leone's Lome Agreement into national legislation could mean that its provisions continue to bind the government, even when the underlying agreement was void, thus preventing the government from prosecuting amnestied crimes in domestic courts). There can also be arguments that notions of estoppel, precommitment, and unilateral declaration would obligate the state. See by deeming the amnesty provision invalid to the extent that it covered certain crimes against humanity, serious war crimes, torture, and other gross violations of human rights;98 or even by finding that the amnesty section applied only to future domestic law proceedings (for which a tenuous basis can be discerned in the wording).99
Kallon does not stand alone: a range of international tribunals may be called upon to adjudicate on the compatibility of peace agreements with international law for a variety of reasons.100 Domestic courts, too, often end up examining the political and legal questions at the heart of the agreement, through constitutional or legislative adjudication that must determine the extent to which the peace agreement is a foundational interpretive document, or indeed a treaty, and where it is a political document to be deferred to as dealing with political questions only.'01 To be sure, in many situations the role of courts and tribunals will be marginal to an agreement's success or failure: courts and tribunals are likely to be ineffective in sustaining an 92 Protocol I, supra note 46, Art. 2; Protocol II, supra note 46, Art. 1. 93 ZEGVELD, supra note 46, at 16-17. 94 Cf Wedgwood, supra note 86, at 36 (arguing that decisions over treaty-making capacity should be made with a view to the implications of so doing). 95 These treaties use state-party commitments to lock in nonstate actors in a two-way dynamic. The state parties in effect guarantee to kindred nonstate actors that the commitments to them in the agreement will be delivered; and to other parties that the commitments of nonstate actors will be honored. To achieve and reinforce this relationship between treaty and nonstate actor, some "unique legal features" were written into these agreements with a view to enabling the nonstate a petition challenging the legality of the Likud government's settlement policy because the matter was a political question and the subject of intensive peace negotiations). 102 See infra text at notes 131-38. 103 Robinson, supra note 101 (in effect revising, to prevent the collapse of the devolved legislature, the very clear electoral procedures set out in the Northern Ireland Act, 1998). 104 The very attempt to contrive treaty status indicates the seriousness of state commitments, raising the costs of noncompliance for the state parties. As noted, it may also be relevant to legal adjudication. Nevertheless, the lack of correlation between the parties to the conflict and the parties to the treaty negates some of the benefits of choosing a clear legal form for the obligations. Treaty status can be achieved only by forgoing the inclusion of the nonstate actor as a direct party to the treaty, even though the nonstate actor's compliance lies at the heart of the agreement's implementation. The reputation costs of formal treaty status will only attach directly to state parties, even though they may lead indirectly to political costs for nonstate actors. 15 If state guarantees on behalf of kindred nonstate groups are undelivered, it will be very difficult to tell whether the reason was insufficient effort or lack of capacity to influence these nonstate actors. As regards state underwriting of commitments to kindred nonstate groups, the state's self-interest may soon induce it to reconsider.116 Moreover, peace-agreement treaties also suffer from two other problems, similar to those 
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[Vol. 100:373 need to address simultaneously both "internal" and "external" dimensions ofintrastate conflict, and the need to address both short-term and long-term peace process goals.
As with treaty form, these distinctive attributes negate some of the "hard law" advantages of constitutional form. Even in traditional settings, constitutional interpretation is accepted as implicating politics in a deeper and more overt way than the interpretation of legislation, in opening up value debates and in requiring an ongoing working out of the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature that cuts to the heart of the relationship between law and politics itself.131 Such controversies are dramatically accentuated in societies that are constructing both core democratic and legal institutions, using a constitution negotiated out ofviolent conflict and tentative beginnings in ceasefires. Indeed, it has been suggested that transitional concepts of constitutionalism require new theories of adjudication.132 Constitutional interpretation in traditional settings draws on established notions of the rule of law and operates to buttress traditional concepts of order, community, and stability. However, in the transitional setting these concepts, and indeed the neutrality of the judiciary itself, are typically deeply contested. These circumstances point to the need for an activist, transformative approach to constitutional interpretation, and a judiciary that is willing and able to engage with the legal and political nature of transition, and the implications for its own role. Peace agreements sometimes signal this need by calling for flexible, "purposive" approaches to constitutional interpretation. 133 Yet the more judges attempt to engage in this type of interpretation, the more they risk politicizing their role, by articulating what appear to be political goals. 34 As the constitutional judicial function will be new by virtue of the context, the legitimacy of both the judiciary and the judicial function itself will be tied up with any goals that judges articulate. The stop-start nature of peace agreements also means that the judicial role is likely to be fundamentally tested by the capacity of key actors to act outside the constitution. In summary, peace agreements are drafted in an attempt to use a legal form and appear to evidence an intent to be legally bound. However, these aims are somewhat frustrated at present by the limits of traditional legal categories, and in particular the difficulty of fitting direct agreements between state and nonstate parties into those categories. The compliance pull gained by achieving obligations with a clear claim to be binding as treaties or constitutions is undermined by the lack of correlation between the parties to the obligation and the formal parties to the agreement, and the peculiar nature of the peace agreement as a process document. These shortcomings point to the importance of legalized models as an alternative to formal legal status and help to explain why peace agreements are characterized by common innovations as regards form, obligations, and third-party delegation, regardless of whether or not they can be placed in a formal legal category.
IV. THE NATURE OF OBLIGATIONS
The limits and deficits of legal form may be compensated for by how an agreement's obligations are crafted, to some extent. Precise and coherent commitments, it is argued, facilitate compliance by imparting clarity regarding implementation and breach, which enhances their normative "compliance pull."'50 Conversely, imprecise language can decrease the normative compliance pull even of obligations framed in legally binding forms. 5' Peace agreement legalization, however, also points to constitutional discourse as an equally important way of framing 164 Cf ADRIAN GUELKE, SOUTH AFRICA IN TRANSITION: A MISUNDERSTOOD MIRACLE (1999) (arguing that South Africa's Interim Constitution has been misunderstood as a constitutional compromise between majority and minority communities, with the strongest restraints on majority power expressly transitional). Note, however, that it can be argued that on occasion the ANC felt politically constrained to work within the existing constitution rather than to amend it unilaterally. 165 Cf Schneckener, supra note 13 (arguing that the key to long-term success of peace agreements lies in institutional design aimed at enabling elite leadership and cooperation). 166 Burundi Peace Agreement, supra note 29, Protocol I, ch. I; South Africa Amendment Act, supra note 121, ?13, Art. XXXIV; Belfast Agreement, supra note 29; Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, pmbl., supra note 50. 167 Cf Abbott & Snidal, supra note 150.
[Vol. 100:373 encounters a problem of anticipation, but also is arguably undesirable.168 A narrow range of actors tends to be involved in peace negotiations; typically, they do not have the expertise, legitimacy, or sometimes even the will necessary to design long-term constitutions and consequent institutional reform in all their value-driven complexity. Processes of ongoing institutional development and reform both serve as a risk management device with similarities to third-party delegation in other contexts and, importantly, lend legitimacy to the constitution-making project. By setting forth principles and processes rather than final provisions, peace negotiations can be concluded more quickly, while also enabling broader civic involvement in the processes of reform-involvement that is important to the local ownership and effectiveness of the new institutions. This is an alternative way of legalizing obligations.
Process Dilemmas: Legalization in Transition
Tensions, however, color the relationship between the short-term and long-term conflict resolution goals of peace agreements. While treatylike internationalized commitments are useful and even important to implementing an agreement in the short term, they may operate in subtle and not-so-subtle ways to negate and frustrate the longer-term goals of domestic constitutionalization. Thus, mediators often face a set of dilemmas as to how to achieve both shortand long-term goals, while providing for functioning institutions during the transitional period.169 These dilemmas include whether to have elections before or after constitutional reform projects; when and how to introduce mechanisms to account for past abuses; when to use international "off-the-peg" legal tools as transitional devices; and whether these measures might undermine localized processes of constitutional development. The dilemmas, often framed as clashes of "principle" and "pragmatism," in fact reflect the tension between different shortterm and long-term conflict resolution imperatives, and the fact that different international and domestic actors have different degrees of legitimacy at different stages of the implementation process.170
The tensions point to a central, distinctive compliance challenge for the legalization of peace agreements. The obligations must be framed so that they can depend on different rationales and mechanisms for enforcement at different stages of the peace process. In their ideal form, peace agreements attempt to incorporate internationalized treatylike commitments with a high degree of third-party enforcement, while enabling a transition to domestic constitutional commitments, implemented through normalized politics and normalized public law processes. The difficulty for drafters is to craft obligations that will pin down commitments that are clear enough to command compliance yet leave some room for the coherent holistic development also crucial to compliance. In summary, precision is a valuable element of peace agreement legalization in the short term, particularly as regards the military commitments and transitional mechanisms of government. It suffers from limitations, however, in providing for the longer-term constitutionalization of commitments as worked out through the entrenched reform of political and legal institutions, where precise detail on wholesale constitutional reform can be counterproductive 168 
Third-Party Guarantors
The majority of peace agreements employ third-party states and international organizations as signatories to agreements, either through direct signature or signature in the capacity of"witnesses," "guarantors," or "observers."172 What this practice means, or whether the terms in which the organization signs have any technical legal implication, is unclear. (Is a "witness" different from a "guarantor," "observer," "moral guarantor," or an "outside" state as an apparently coequal signatory without specific commitments?) While these states and organizations often continue to be involved in the peace process, little discussion has been devoted to whether or how their involvement is shaped by their signature and the particular label by which they are described as a third party to the agreement. argued that third-party effectiveness lies more in its norm promotion capacity than in delivering security guarantees.174 Using Central America as an example, they argue that the peace processes followed a three-stage trajectory illustrating this role: (1) local actors in the conflicts adopted liberal practices to legitimate themselves internationally; (2) internationally mediated negotiations demonstrated to the combatants that the adversaries had changed their preferences and could be trusted to move from violence to the political rules set out in the peace agreements; and (3) [Vol. 100:373public and private spheres. This requirement gives rise to two difficulties for any theory of compliance. First, peace agreements focus on processes as much as outcomes, so that what constitutes compliance with them is under negotiation even as they are being implemented. This suggests a need to have some basis for distinguishing between the compliance pull oftransnational legal processes on the parties and simple renegotiation.224 Second, the notion of internalizing norms is complicated by the position of domestic law in the peace agreement setting, where it is both object and subject of negotiation. Paradoxically, these difficulties characteristically result in the internationalization of domestic legal processes. International involvement itself, however, faces increasing normative and legitimacy challenges as time passes, creating a transitional dilemma for its norm promotion capacity. While full elaboration of how any theory of compliance can account for these complications is beyond the scope of this article, it is suggested that understanding the common dynamics of peace agreement legalization-the lex pacificatoria-is a key starting point. Only through identifying the essential elements of peace agreement practice and understanding the extent to which it is both a unified and a legal practice can further lines of inquiry be established.
The Casefor the Lex Pacificatoria
To be characterized as lexpacificatoria, peace agreement legalization must make the case that it is law (lex); and that it is distinct to peacemakers (pacificatoria). As regards lex, this article has argued that peace agreement practice evidences a strong degree of coherence stemming from the importance of legalization to achieving agreement between parties in the first place. Understanding the lex pacificatoria embodied in peace agreement legalization makes an important contribution to these empirical debates because it reveals why some of the empirical quandaries are so intractable. If peace agreements are identified as transitional constitutions, then the difficulty of measuring success or failure lies in the difficulty of evaluating whether a constitution is successful or not. Clearly, there are empirical ways to measure success or failure, based on level of violent conflict or whether the constitution's institutions are up and running. 229 See, e.g., Burundi Peace Agreement, supra note 29 (signed by a range of political parties as well as armed opposition groups); see also Dili Peace Accord, Apr. 21, 1999 (signed by the National Council of Timorese Resistance and Falantil, and the Pro-integration Party); cf South Africa National Peace Accord, Sept. 14, 1991, available at <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/sa4.pdf> (signed by ANC and National Party government, and a range of forty parties, including civic actors). 230 The above discussion has indicated that the legitimacy and the effectiveness of peace agreement legalization are related. Unless we understand the coherence of peace agreement legalization as having the force of law, we risk losing sight of a necessary discussion as to the identity of the moral and normative underpinnings of the emerging lex. Such a loss leaves technical devices and patterns-from constitutional blueprints to transitional justice mechanisms-to be rolled out without any coherent comparative discussion of whether they build on or undermine their possible normative justifications.237 Without this discussion it can be somewhat puzzling why virtually identical measures seem legitimate and successful in some cases and illegitimate and unsuccessful in others.
Unveiling a lexpacificatoria reveals not just the normative capacity of international law, but the capacity of peace agreement practice to recast its norms.238 This capacity reaches its height where peace agreement practice touches on normative gaps with regard to how international law deals with both mainly internal conflict and transitional situations.239 The peace agreement phenomenon and the emerging lexpacificatoria therefore stand firmly at the heart of current debates over the future direction and power of international law itself and deserve further consideration. 
